Abstract We present a model where firms engage in imperfect price competition, firms cannot sell to all consumers. A bipartite network structure models the local interaction of firms and consumers. We solve for the unique equilibrium of duopolistic price competition and study the implications of network structure on pricing behavior and welfare. Aggregate surplus is maximized with a fully connected network, which corresponds to perfect competition, and decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected until firms become local monopolists. We then explore which networks are likely to form. Stable networks are between the network with perfect competition and networks with local monopolists. Finally, we extend our results to more then two firms in the case where some consumers can buy from a single firm and some consumers can buy from all firms.
Introduction
In standard models of competition, firms can sell to all consumers. Nevertheless, in many interesting markets, firms have a restricted access to consumers and must compete with other firms under asymmetric potential consumers. This restriction can come from technological constraints, for example when consumers have to invest in a technological platform in order to buy from firms; from geographical constraints, as in land or maritime trade routes; or infrastructure constraints, as in the gas, electricity or water markets, where the transportation infrastructure is fixed in the short run.
1
This paper proposes using a network to model the possible transactions between sellers and buyer by relating the graph-theoretical properties on the network with strategic pricing and welfare. The network allows for a rich structure of limited interaction between sellers and buyers. Therefore, we address the age-old question of what lies between the extreme cases of a perfect monopoly and perfect competition. Networks model are not the first to allow for local interaction. The closest class of model are the spatial location models, also called Hotelling models.
2 We view network models as providing a tractable alternative for different environments.
Our main findings are that under price competition, aggregate surplus decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected but the payoffs for individual firms are not monotonic. Aggregate surplus is maximizes by a fully connected network which generates perfect competition. The maximum inefficiency occurs in disconnected networks where each firm is a local monopolist. We find that stable networks are midway between the two extremes.
We find that firms do not always want to have access to more consumers because it could 1 In the US, natural gas pipelines are privately owned and offer a a bundled service of purchase and delivery to to local distribution companies and large industrial buyers. The industry has traditionally been heavily regulated but in 1996 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) decided to allow marketbased transportation rates to allow for a greater supply-demand responsiveness. A necessary condition to deregularize a pipeline was showing it did not have significant market power. For a more detailed analysis see [McAfee & Reny, 2007] .
2 For a reference see [Tirole, 1988] .
increase the aggressiveness of competition. Stable networks are those where firms balance the trade-off between more potential consumers and more aggressive competition. We also find that firms do not want to have the ability to price-discriminate because it makes competition more aggressive.
Two important previous papers on the matter are [Kranton & Minehart, 2001] and [Corominas-Bosch, 2004] . Both papers deal with buyer-seller networks. The main difference between these papers and ours is the market protocol used to determined prices and allocations. We model the market through price (Bertrand) competition. Kranton & Minehart use an ascending-bid auction that simultaneously determines prices for all sellers.
Corominas-Bosch analyzes an alternating-offers bargaining protocol. More recent paper by [Blume et al. , 2007] solves a model where traders balance supply and demand by setting a spread between the price for buyers and for consumers; while [Elliot, 2008] finds the core allocations for trades with heterogenous values.
In contrast to our model, all of the cited papers find that the allocation is efficient conditional on the feasibility constraint imposed the network.
3 Even degenerate networks where firms are monopolists have full efficiency! Therefore their choice of the underlying economic environment does not allow us to see how the network structure moves welfare with through it's influence on the market power of each agent. The only thing we can be sure of is that the network structure does not add any interesting inefficiency of it's own.
In our model we allow both full efficiency and for inefficiencies dor the networks that correspond to the standard cases studied in economics: perfect competition and monopoly pricing. We then ask how the network mediates the inefficiency as we move get networks that are more similar to one or the other.
To analyze which networks are likely to form we take two approaches. First we study the properties of pairwise-stable networks. Pair-wise stable networks are between networks with local monopolists and the network with perfect competition. Next we study a couple of 3 Corominas-Bosch does find inefficiencies in the way the network is formed.
entry games where before the pricing game firms chose which links they want to form with consumers in the other firm's niche. It turns out that the equilibrium of the entry games are always pairwise-stable.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic duopoly model; Section 2 The Duopoly Model Figure 1 : A number C 1 of consumers can only buy from Firm 1, a number C 2 from F 2 ; and a number C 1,2 can buy from any firm.
Our model has a finite number consumers and that there are two firms, labeled F 1 and F 2 . Firms and consumers are represented by nodes on a network. Let C 1 denote the number of consumers who can only buy from Firm 1, C 2 the number who can only buy from F 2 , and C 1,2 the number who can buy from both. Consumers must be linked to a firm to be able to buy it's product or service. In Figure 1 , for example, C 1 can only buy from F 1 while C 1,2
can buy from both F 1 and F 2 .
The network structure is exogenously determined before any transactions are carried out and is common knowledge between the players. We will discuss how the network is formed in Section 3.
We refer to the C 1 and C 2 -type consumers as locked-in consumers, to the C 1,2 -type as mobile consumers and label the firms such that Firm 1 is the one with weakly more locked-in consumers:C 1 C 2 .
Consumers can only buy one product. They has a value for the product that is private information. Products from different firms are perfect substitutes. Values drawn independently from a common distribution function. Let Q(p) be the probability that a consumer has a value higher or equal to p. That is, Q is defined over [0, ∞) → [0, 1] and is decreasing.
We assume Q is differentiable.
For tractability we assume that Q has a decreasing marginal revenue in prices.
This assumption to gives tractable predictions for firms who only focus on the revenue from their locked-in consumers. In our model, firms face a trade-off between the gains from acting more monopolistically and acting more competitively. The decreasing marginal revenue property ensures there is a unique solution for a firm who acts like a monopolist.
Also, for the price range below this unique solution, any increases in prices lead to increases in the revenue from "locked-in" consumers. This monotonicity of revenues will be useful in solving for equilibrium. We discuss this in more detail in Section 2.2.
The nodes C j can also be thought as different locations and we can interpret Q as the total demand at each location, where we normalized the maximum possible demand at each location has been normalized to C j . In this case a sufficient condition to have the decreasing marginal revenue party is that the demand has a weakly decreasing elasticity, which can be checked by verifying the demand is log-concave.
Firms engage in Bertrand competition. Each firm simultaneously announces a price it will charge to any consumer for buying her product. Firms cannot price discriminate. We show the consequences of allowing price discrimination in Section 2.4. Consumers first observe all prices and then chose to buy from the cheapest firm available to them with probability Q(p).
They randomize equally across firms in case of a tie.
Firms maximize their expected profits. We assume firms have a constant marginal cost for selling their products which we normalize to zero. Firms have no fixed costs. Therefore profits are simply the quoted price times the quantity sold, which is determined by the prices of both firms as above. Let π j (p 1 , p 2 ) denote the profits for Firm j when firms quote (p 1 , p 2 ).
A pure strategy for firm j is a simply a price p j she wishes to quote. Firms can quote any non-negative number.
To find equilibria in general we will need to allow firms to randomly select with a price.
Definition 1. A mixed strategy pricing scheme for Firm j if it is a distribution function
Abusing notation, we use π j (σ 1 , σ 2 ) for the expected profit for firm j when firms are randomizing according to (σ 1 , σ 2 ). A subscript −j denotes the firm who is not j. In the oligopoly section it denotes all firms that are not j.
To solve the game we look for Nash equilibria. Because the behavior of consumers is completely captured by Q(p), we focus on the strategies for the firms.
Definition 2. A Nash Equilibrium of the pricing game is a strategy profile, (σ 1 , σ 2 ), such that no player j can deviate to an alternative mixed strategy σ j and get a higher payoff:
We denote by a star-supercript strategies that constitute an equilibrium, (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ). Let (π Next we develop an example to preview how to solve the game and expose some of the results of the paper. Those interested in going directly to the details of solving the model can skip to Section (2.2).
An Example
Two consumers, A and B, wish to cross a river to go to an Irish pub. To do so, they must cross through one of two available bridges. Each bridge is independently operated by a firm that charges a toll to any consumer who wishes to cross. Consumers are willing to pay up to 1 to cross the river. The only cost they incur is that of the toll. In addition, an exogenous road network limits the choice of bridges for each consumer. For example, in After observing them consumers choose which bridge to cross, if any.
In the Monopolistic Network, Figure ( 2), each firm knows she has a monopoly and quotes prices to extract all surplus:
The Competitive Network, Figure ( 3), is a standard Bertrand competition where firms undercut each other until they vanish their profits.
In the Mixed Case Network, Figure (4) , F 1 has a locked-in consumer (C 1 ) from where she can extract all her valuation by charging p 1 = 1. Alternatively she can try to compete
The Irish Pub
Figure 2: (The Monopolistic Network) Each Firm is a monopoly in their local market
The Irish Pub There is unique a mixed strategy equilibrium. This is described below with it's corresponding expected profits. . With probability 1 2 chose p < 1 and then price according to:
F 2 : Price according to:
From the example we can already see that firms are not always better off by having access to more consumers. In the Mixed Case Network, Firm 2 receives a payoff strictly larger than in the Competitive Network because the more aggressive competition dissipates profits.
Another result that generalizes to the duopoly model is that in equilibrium Firm 1 receives a payoff exactly equal to the monopoly rents from her locked-in consumers. It is fairly direct to deduce her payoff could not be smaller than this. The fact that it's exactly the same comes from Firm 1's has a higher opportunity cost for charging low prices which places it at a disadvantage to compete for the mobile consumers. This does not mean Firm 1 only sells to it's locked-in consumers. As we see in the example she sells to all potential consumers with some probability.
Equilibrium pricing strategies for our model are also qualitatively similar to those in the example. Firm 1 quotes the price the maximizes her monopoly payoffs (1 in the example) with a discrete probability and both firms mix continuously over prices below. In the example, both firms can be sure to sell to both consumers if they set a price equal to 1/2. This is the minimum price Firm 1 is willing to quote. Any price lower must forcefully yield an expected
profit lower than what she can assures herself by charging the monopoly price. Since quoting lower prices is strictly dominated for Firm 1 they are also ruled out for Firm 2.
Solving the Duopoly Model
Let's return to analyzing an arbitrary network with two firms and any number of consumers. To solve the model it's useful to derive two useful properties from the decreasing marginal revenue property of the distribution of consumer values, Q(v). First, there is a unique price p M that maximizes revenue from locked-in consumers. It turns this price is the same price for all firms because the number of "locked-in" consumers only change the optimization by rescaling it. Second, over the price range below below p M any increase in prices yields higher revenues from the locked-in consumers.
Proposition 1. For any firm with C j > 0 consider the maximization over the revenue from only her locked-in consumers:
If Q(·) has the decreasing marginal revenue property there is a unique price, labeled p M , that solves the monopolist's problem. This price is independent of C j . Furthermore, for any prices p, p such that p < p p M , p yields a higher revenue than p from the locked-in consumers.
Proof. First we show existence. Note that the limit of the objective function as p goes to infinity is zero. For low values of p it is strictly positive. Therefore we can restrain attention to a compact subset of the price space. The theorem of the maximum guarantees existence. Now we show uniqueness. Take the derivative of the objective function:
By the decreasing marginal revenue property derivative of the objective function crosses zero only once and from above. Call p M the value where it crosses zero. This is the unique maximum and does not depend on C j . Furthermore, for values below p M , the derivative is positive, so any infinitesimal increase in the price increases revenues. By the fundamental theorem of calculus, the change in revenue between any two prices below p M is equal to the integral of this derivative, therefore revenue increases monotonically until it reaches it's maximum.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that any price above p M is strictly dominated:
decreasing the price to p M would strictly increase the revenue from the locked-in consumers, while weakly increasing the probability of winning the mobile consumers.
Proposition (2) shows that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria except for two extreme cases. One is the standard Bertrand competition which corresponds to C 1 = C 2 = 0; the other is when each firm is a separate monopolist, C 1,2 = 0.
Proposition 2. There is no pure strategy equilibria for the model with C 1 > 0 and C 1,2 > 0.
Proof. An pure strategy equilibrium with with a positive price can be ruled out by the standard Bertrand argument as follows. Take a strategy profile (p j , p −j ) such that p −j < p j p M , then player −j would wish to deviate to pricing arbitrarily closer to p j . Now assume p j = p −j > 0, then any player could deviate to an arbitrarily smaller price obtaining a discrete gain from avoiding the probability of a tie while charging essentially the same price. Finally, assume (p j , p −j ) = (0, 0), then F 1 could deviate to extracting a positive profit by quoting p M and selling to her locked-in consumers.
We therefore look for mixed strategy nash equilibria. It will turn out that the equilibrium is unique and involves mixing over a continuous interval. Proposition 3 solves for the equilibrium payoffs. To obtain them the proof first solves for some standard properties of continuous mixed strategies and Bertrand competition: ties cannot occur with positive probability; strategies have no atoms below the upper bound on prices, p M ; strategies must have a common support for the two firms; strategies cannot have gaps in their support and must not have gaps below the upper bound on prices, p M . These are enough to pin down the equilibrium payoffs. Corollary 1 solves for the unique equilibrium strategies by plugging the equilibrium payoffs into the mixed strategy indifference condition.
Proposition 3. The unique equilibrium payoffs for the duopoly network pricing game are:
Proof. See Appendix (A).
Corollary 1. The unique mixed strategy equilibrium for the duopoly network pricing game are:
For F 1 : "Stay out" with probability 1 −
by charging the monopoly price;
For F 2 : Always "go in": charge below p M with probability 1.
For Both: Conditional on going-in mix according to:
Proof. See Appendix (B).
Welfare
We can use the payoffs in Proposition (3) to do comparative statics on welfare by changing the number of consumers.
Firm 1's payoff does not depend on the size of the mobile market, C 1,2 , nor on the size of Firm 2's locked-in market, C 2 . She gets a profit which is exactly the same as if extracted the monopoly surplus from her locked-in consumers. This does not mean Firm 1 doesn't sell to the mobile consumers. She does with positive probability. Nevertheless, in equilibrium Firm 1 must be made indifferent between quoting the monopoly price and quoting below.
As such the mixing must be such that any increase in expected sales by lowering prices must be exactly offset the decrease in price.
Firm 2 has a profit that is strictly increasing the number of her own locked-in consumers.
Her profits are also strictly increasing in the number of mobile consumers, C 1,2 . Surprisingly her payoffs are also strictly increasing in the number of locked-in consumers Firm 1 has.
The driving force is the effect on competition. A larger number of C 1 makes Firm 1 less aggressive, which is beneficial for Firm 2. Firm 2's profits are smaller than those of Firm 1 but larger than the rents from the monopoly rents out of her locked-in consumers.
The inequalities are strict whenever, respectively, C 1 > C 2 and C 1,2 > 0.
Every consumer is weakly better off by any increase in the number of mobile consumers, C 1,2 , because the distribution of prices shifts downwards. The old distribution first-order stochastically dominates the new distribution.
Aggregate surplus is maximized by equating demand to marginal cost. Because of we normalized marginal cost to zero this is equivalent to producing to fulfill all demand. Higher prices create deadweight loss.
Price Discrimination
Firms would prefer not to be able to price-discriminate between mobile and locked-in consumers. If both firms could discriminate in prices, profits from the mobile consumers would completely dissipate. Firm 1 would be indifferent between being able to price discriminate or not, she doesn't receive any profit from mobile consumers anyway. Nevertheless, if there were an arbitrarily low cost from being able to price-discriminate, she would be deterred from trying. Firm 2 would strictly prefer price discrimination were not possible as long as
Each firm would wish to be able to discriminate if the other firm could not. If a firm were the only one with the ability to discriminate, she could compete for the mobile consumers without sacrificing any rents from her locked-in consumers. The discriminating firm would get the same profit from the mobile consumers as Firm 2 in our duopoly model with C 2 = 0.
The firm's total profit would be that plus the monopoly rents from it's locked-in consumers.
As long as the other firm had some locked-in consumers, the discriminating firm could get a positive gain from this.
The 
We are not proposing the table above as a game that is played by the firms. Whether price discrimination is possible or not, and how costly it would be to implement, depends on the application at hand. For example, in the bridge example it might not be cost-effective to identify the geographical origin when a large number of consumers is crossing at rush hour.
Our analysis up to now has taken the network as given. Given that the network structure can have a big influence on welfare it is important to know which networks are more likely to arise. To do so we will proceed in two different ways.
We will first ignore the precise protocol of how links are formed and and look for a solution from cooperative game theory. We will look for networks that are pairwise-stable with respect to the payoffs induced by the pricing game. We find that stable networks are always between the two extreme cases of networks with local monopolists and networks with perfect competition.
We will next analyze two "entry" games where we precisely specify how and when firms can form links. These games will consist of two stages, an entry stage and a pricing stage. The network will be determined at the entry stage after which the pricing stage will start treating the network as given. The pricing stage will correspond exactly to our pricing model. It will turn out that the equilibria of the entry game are a subset of the pairwise-stable networks.
Entry games are more than a device to understand which networks are likely to form. The entry games considered here are different from the traditional ones in that entry can be partial: we allow firms to establish links with some consumers without having allow access to all consumers in the incumbent's niche.
pairwise-stable networks
Fix the total number of consumers, 6 for a given network we ask if a firm has an incentive to add or delete links to the existing consumers. By adding and deleting links, firms change the network. The payoff for a firm from a network will be her expected payoff of the pricing game that would be carried out under such a network. When we say firms have incentives to add or delete links, we are doing a comparative statics across the payoffs from different networks in our pricing model. There is no cost to forming links. Unlinked firms and consumers get a payoff of zero. We want to characterize all the networks that are pairwise-stable.
Definition 3 (pairwise-stable networks). A network is pairwise-stable if :
• No unlinked firm-consumer pair can become linked and increase the payoff of both members.
• No firm or consumer can delete one of their links and increase their individual payoff.
The Competitive Network of the tollway example we analyzed in Section 2.1 was not pairwise-stable. Any of the two firm could increase their profit by deleting a link. Both the Monopolistic Network and the Mixed Network were pairwise stable, even though Firm 2 received a strictly smaller payoff in the later. This because Firm 1 has no strict incentive to add or remove the link that connect it to Consumer B.
Only the firms' incentives determine if a network is pairwise-stable because, as we saw in the welfare section (Section 2.3), adding a link between any firm and any consumer increases the expected payoffs of all consumers.
Firms would never want to delete links to their locked-in consumers and would always want to add a link to consumers that are not linked to the other firm.
Firm 1 is always indifferent between adding links or not to consumers that are linked to Firm 2. These would only increase C 1,2 and decrease C 2 by one, but this does not affect her equilibrium payoffs.
Firm 2 would have an incentive to add a link to a consumer of type C 1 if and only if:
That is, only if her potential consumer once the link is added is not larger than Firm 1's locked-in market.
Except for integer constraints, Firm 2 would want to increase links at low levels of C 1,2 but would want to decrease them at high levels. (As long as C 2 < C 1 ) In this sense, pairwisestable networks are bounded away from the networks with local monopolists and from those with perfect competition.
Entry Game 1
Suppose Firm 1 is the incumbent and initially has links with all potential consumers.
Firm 2 enters by forming links with the consumers. She can decide to form any number of links. After Firm 2 makes her decision, the network is fixed and the pricing game is played out.
How many links would Firm 2 wish to form? What would be the final network formed?
Firm 2 solves:
Where E is the level of entry measured by the number of links formed to enter.
Using the results in Section 3.1 we know that Firm 2 would continue to add links while the following condition holds:
Therefore Firm 2 would stop forming links much before she takes away all of Firm 1's locked-in market, to keep Firm 1 from being too aggressive in the subsequent pricing game.
Roughly speaking she would only enter half of the potential market.
A similar effect has been previously shown in the entry games literature. It was labeled by [Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984] as the "fat cat effect". The "fat cat effect" refers to a situation of strategic over-investment in capital by the incumbent firm to act less agressive conditional on an entry she knows she cannot deter. The effect is also present in the multi-market oligopoly model of [Bulow et al. , 1985] .
Our focus on the entry stage is different than the previous models. There the incumbent chose to be a "fat cat" by over-investing in capital. In our model it's the entrant who choses to keep the incumbent as a "fat cat" by only entering partially.
Would Firm 1, given a chance, wish to delete links to her initial consumers to accomodate Firm 2 in better terms? Could she perhaps even deter entry by sustaining a "lean and hungry" stance described by [Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984] ? The answer is negative. If Firm preemptively broke some links, Firm 2 would form links to any unlinked consumer and then continue to form links while the condition holds:
The final amount of C 1 would remain unchanged.
7 Since Firm 1's payoff only depends on this amount, she would never wish to break links to accomodate Firm 2.
Entry Game 2
Suppose now that initially Firm 1 and Firm 2 have two separate monopolies. That is, at the initial stage there are only locked-in consumers. We keep the convention that Firm 1 starts out as the dominant firm: C 1 > C 2 . The game starts with the the entry stage where firms are allowed to simultaneously form links with consumers in the other firms locked-in market. Once all link are formed the network is fixed and the pricing game is carried out.
This could be the case of two separate regional monopolies held in place by a restriction to sell across borders. The entry stage occurs after a free trade agreement lifts restrictions across borders, but firms still have to decide in which locations across the border they want to set-up a point of sale. It could also represent two similar products that in the pre-entry stage could not reach the same consumers because of regulation or technological restrictions.
This happened in the phone and cable service markets where technological advances allowed cable providers to supply phone services and viceversa, although companies still had the ability to decide in which regions they would operate.
In the entry stage firms simultaneously announce the number of links they will form with the other firm's locked-in consumers. This announcement is their level of entry. We seek to find how many links would each firm wish to form in a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The set of Nash Equilibria of the Entry Game 2 is:
Where the Integer function maps intervals to the set of integers inside that interval.
Proof. Their profits from a strategy profile (E 1 , E 2 ) are π 1 (E 1 , E 2 ) as described below.
First we rule out any strategy profile that makes Firm 2 the dominant firm after entry.
Take any strategy profile such that:
Firm 1's best response would be to set her entry level as low as possible: E 1 = 0. For this strategy Firm 2's best response is Integer[
]. This level of entry is not enough to make Firm 2 the dominant firm after entry. Therefore there are no equilibria where this happens.
If after entry Firm 1 is still going to be the dominant firm, then Firm 2's unique best response is:
For this profile Firm 1's best response set is:
In equilibrium Firm 2 always enters partially. The level of entry is always low enough such that Firm 1 still remains the dominant firm after entry. Firm 1 has multiple best responses but has no strict incentive to enter Firm 2's locked-in market. Doing so does not alter her payoff nor alter Firm 2's preferences over entry levels. Adding an arbitrarily small cost to forming links would reduce the set of equilibria to a unique strategy profile where only Firm 2 enters as described above.
8
Consumer surplus and aggregate surplus strictly increase with the partial entry.
8 Except for the case where
is an integer. In that case adding an arbitrarily small cost would diminish Firm 2's entry level by one link.
In equilibrium the Firms have no incentive to change they're links. Because only firms' incentives matter to determine which networks are pairwise stable, equilibrium networks of the entry games must necessarily be pairwise stable.
Extending the results for oligopolistic competition
For applications it would be useful to extend the model to allow for an arbitrary number of firms. Unfortunately it quickly becomes intractable. The potential types of consumers include all possible subsets of firms. These grow exponentially.
Nevertheless, we can solve a special case of oligopolistic competition where consumers come in two types: locked-in consumers who can only buy from one firm and perfectly mobile consumers who can buy from all firms. We will find that most of the pricing behavior and payoffs extend to this model.
There are several applications that fit this type of environment. For example, a situation where some people are already locked into a specific technology while other people are waiting for the prices to be determined before they decide which technology to adopt.
Small fixed-costs for adopting technology could be easily included in the model. Another pertinent environment is one where some consumers buy online and can see the all the price information, while others just go to their local store and cannot react to prices from other firms. A third application would treat the network as a model of brand loyalty. Firms face a trade-off between tendering to completely loyal consumers or competing for extreme price seeking consumers.
In this model the pricing action will happen between the most agressive firms, those with the lowest opportunity cost for lowering their prices. All other firms will give up on capturing the mobile market and stay out by pricing the monopoly price.
We solve this model in Section 4.1. We will discuss what we know and what we don't for the general oligopolistic model in Section 4.2.
An arbitrary number of firms competing in a single market
The model we are considering has a finite number J of firms each with some of locked-in consumers. 9 We label firms such that:
In addition to their locked-in consumers, all firms can compete to sell in a large global market that has a number C G of consumers. Consumer values and the pricing game are as before.
There is always an equilibrium where Firms J and J − 1 play as described in the duopoly model while all other firms price p M . We refer to this pricing behavior as "staying out"
because the equilibrium probability that they will capture the global market is zero. Proposition (5) shows proves that this is an equilibrium.
The intuition behind the proof is that firms face a trade-off between extracting all the surplus from their locked-in consumers or lowering their price to try to capture to the global consumers. There are two effects that keep firms with more locked-in consumers out. They face a higher opportunity cost from lowering prices; and they to face an fiercer competition if they enter because to win the global market they have to quote the minimum price of ALL firms going in. This two forces move in the right direction to sustain the equilibrium.
These strategies turns out to be the unique equilibrium when we assume that only two firms have the have the smallest number of consumers. That is, when C J−2 > C J−1 . This is proven in Proposition (6). Uniqueness follows from the fact the is a price interval where firms J and J − 1 must necessarily mix as in the duopoly model. But higher firms cannot be made indifferent between quoting the monopoly price and a lower one. This is proven in Proposition 6.
Proposition 5. The following strategies always constitute an equilibrium of the oligopoly model:
The strategies for j > J − 1 are: Quote p j = p M with probability 1.
Firms J − 1 and J play as in the duopoly model, all other firms just quote the monopoly price.
Proof. See Appendix (C).
Proposition 6. The strategies in Proposition (5) constitute the unique equilibrium strategy
Proof. See Appendix (D).
The additional assumption in Proposition (6) is necessary for uniqueness. For example, if it fails we can construct symmetric equilibria where all the firms tied at the bottom enter. Nevertheless all equilibria are payoff equivalent and only firms with the two lowest C j parameter can actively mix.
Remarks on the general oligopoly model
What can we say for networks with any number of consumers who can arbitrarily buy from any subset of the firms?
Existence of equilibrium is guaranteed by the main the existence theorem for discontinuous games in [Dasgupta & Maskin, 1986] . 10 Broadly, for the theorem to hold we require the following:
• The set of pure strategies be a compact set of R m . We fulfill this by restricting attention to the game with prices between zero and the monopolist price, because prices 10 Indeed, this theorem was motivated by Bertrand competition models like these.
above are weakly dominated for all firms. Any equilibrium of the restricted game will be an equilibrium of the unrestricted game.
• Payoff functions must be continuous except for subset of a continuous manifold of dimension smaller than the strategy space. This continuous manifold can be defined in our model as follows. For each j ∈ 1, . . . , J define:
• The sum of all payoffs must be upper semi-continuous and each individual payoff must be weakly lower semi-continuous. See below for the definition of upper semi-continuity and weak lower semi-continuity.
Theorem. [Dasgupta & Maskin, 1986] Existence of equilibria in discontinuous games.
[section] Let A j ⊂ R (j ∈ {1, . . . , J}) be a closed interval and let π j : ⊗A i → R (j ∈ {1, . . . , J}) be continuous except on a subset A * * (i) of A * (i) as defined in (1).
Suppose J j=1 π j is upper semi-continuous and π j (p j , p −j ) is bounded and weakly lower semi-continuous in p j . Then the game possesses a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Proof. The sum of all firms' payoffs is simply the aggregate demand at the lowest available price to each consumer, it is therefore continuous, a particular case of upper semi-continuous.
The discontinuity points in each players individual payoffs only occur when two or more players are tied for the lowest offered price for consumers they all have links to. The limit from above for this utility function is the firm's payoff at such a price losing those consumers; the limit from below is payoff at such a price selling to all those consumers. Choosing λ equal to 1/2 makes the expression exact when two firms are tied and verifies the inequality it for prices where multiple firms are tied.
Even though existence is guaranteed, the guess-and-verify approach we took in Section (4.1) does not work. The candidate strategy profile is no longer an equilibrium if there is at least single consumer that can only buy from two or more of the firms who stayed out (j > J − 1) because such firms would be tying over a shared consumer with positive probability. This cannot happen in price competition.
It is also not easy to construct new equilibria. To build the equilibrium for the special case of many firms, we showed that firms with more locked-in consumers were less willing to lower prices. For arbitrary networks this not true. When consumers can buy from arbitrary subsets of firms, then those with a higher number of locked-in consumers no longer necessarily might also have access to larger number of mobile consumers. It is no longer easy to figure out which firms actively mix at every price range.
A Solving for equilibrium payoffs of the duopoly model. Proposition 3.
Proof. Suppose σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a strategy profile. We know σ must hold the mixed strategy indifference condition:
With equality almost everywhere with respect to σ j . First, note that very low prices can be ruled out by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies: Firm 1 would never charge a price so low that selling to all consumers would yield less than her monopoly rents. Firm 2 would also never charge prices strictly below this point. By charging arbitrarily close to Firm 1's entry point, Firm 2 can always guarantee herself a positive payoff. We now solve for some standard properties of equilibria that involve mixing over a continuous interval:
The no atoms property Pricing strategies have no atoms below p M . If a Firm j had an atom in her distribution at some price p < p M , then there would be an > 0 such that F −j cannot be optimizing by mixing over [p, p + ). But then Firm j would not be optimizing because by the decreasing marginal revenue property she could charge p + and increase her profits for her locked-in consumers without affecting the probability of selling the mobile consumers.
The no ties property Ties cannot occur with positive probability. We already ruled out ties below p M by the no atoms property. Ties at p M only happen if both firms have an atom at p M . This cannot happen in equilibrium because any firm could profitably deviate to charging arbitrarily close to p M , obtaining a discrete increase in the probability of winning the mobile consumers.
The common support property The support of both firm's the mixed strategy must be the same. On the contrary, suppose a firm is the only one mixing over an interval, then such a firm is not optimizing because she could shift probability mass to the upper-bound of such an interval.
The no gaps property In equilibrium there cannot be an interval (p , p ) with p p M such that some firm mixes below p' but no firm mixes in (p , p ). Suppose there is such an interval, then charging p has the same probability of winning the mobile consumers than p with a higher price. Therefore charging p is strictly better than charging prices arbitrarily close to p'. Any firm mixing close to p would not be optimizing.
The mix to the top property σ j (p) < 1 for all p < p M . Suppose not. Letp be the upper bound for the support Firm j's mixed strategy such thatp < p M . From the common support property we know that Firm −j is also mixing up top. Firm −j would not be optimizing because close top she has an arbitrarily low probability of winning the mobile consumers and could shift probability mass to charging the monopoly price from her locked-in consumers. If Firm −j had no locked-in consumers she would be making profits arbitrarily close to zero, which cannot happen in a equilibrium.
Using the mix to the top property and the mixed strategy indifference condition we know that the equilibrium profits for both firms must equal the limit of expected profits as prices tend to p M . From the no ties property we know that this limit must be equal to monopoly revenues for locked-in consumers for at least one of the two firms:
No ties property ⇒ lim
For some j ∈ {1, 2}.
As in the example in Section 2.1, this must be Firm 1. To see that, note that there is a unique price,p, that makes Firm 1 indifferent between capturing the whole market and extracting her monopoly rents. This price solves:
Firm 1 would never charge below this price. By the no atoms property Firm 2 can always guarantee herself, in equilibrium, a payoff equal to capturing the whole market at this price.
This profit is higher than her own monopoly profits:
We conclude that Firm 1 cannot get a payoff higher than her monopoly rents. This implies that the support of equilibrium strategies must mix all the way down top. By the no atoms property, Firm 2's profits are the equal to:
(C 2 + C 1,2 )
B Solving for equilibrium strategies for the duopoly model. Corollary 1.
Proof. From the mixed strategy indifference condition we get:
; ∀p
With equality almost everywhere with respect to σ j . As usual, the payoff for player −j determines the strategy for player j. From the no atoms property we know this has to hold with equality at the point where the right hand side expresion zero. From the common support property we know this isp, the price at which Firm 1 would be indifferent between capturing the whole market and extracting her monopoly rents. From the no gaps property and the mix to the top property we know the mixed strategy indifference condition holds with equality in the range [p, p M ). Finally from the monopolist's problem, Proposition (1), we know prices higher than p M can never be charged so any excess probability for Firm 1 must be concentrated at an atom at p M .
D Proving that the strategies for the duopoly model are the unique equilibrium of the oligopoly model.
Proposition 6.
Proof. To solve for the unique equilibrium we must use some of the properties of equilibrium strategies we found for the duopoly model. Below we provide some clarifications on how these properties extend to the oligopoly model. The proofs work pretty much as before, we therefore just sketch them.
• No atoms property: No firm can have atoms in their strategy below their monopoly price, because it would imply that for a price range above such an atom, no other firm could mix and be optimizing.
• No ties at the top property: Ties cannot occur with positive probability. Therefore at least one Firm must quote below p M with probability 1. This guarantees that if several firms have an atom at p M they will not tie for the mobile consumers with positive probability.
• Mixing to the top properties: All firms must mix all the way up to the monopoly price.
• Overlapping support property: For any price range where a Firm is mixing, at least one other Firm must also be mixing.
Because there can't be ties at the top, there is at least one firm who doesn't have an atom at p M . All other firms must have an expected utility of p M Q M C j , by the mixing to the top property. Definep j as the unique price that makes Firm j indifferent between capturing the mobile market and extracting the monopoly rents from her locked-in consumers. Since only Firm J would be willing to price in [p J ,p J−1 ) she can always guarantee herself a payoff higher than her monopoly rents. Therefore she cannot have an atom at the monopoly price.
The equilibrium strategy profile must involve mixing abovep j for all j. Firms J and J − 1 are the only one who can be mixing in [p J−1 ,p J−2 ) and therefore they must do it according to the strategies in Proposition (5). Repeating the proof in Proposition (5) using the fact that C J−2 > C J−1 we can verify that for any price p such that below it Firms J and J − 1 price with the prescribed strategies, all other firms would strictly prefer to charge p M to p.
Therefore the strategies in Proposition (5) are the unique equilibrium.
